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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
CHARLES ALLEN McCARTHY, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
12260 
Appellant, Charles Allen McCarthy, appeals from 
a finding of guilty of attempted grand larceny and the 
sentence imposed thereon in the Third District Court, 
Salt Lake County, Stale of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On April 29, 1970, appellant Charles Allen Mc-
Carthy, having been convicted by a jury, was sentenced 
1 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and committed to the Utah State Prison for the offense 
of attempted grand larceny. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant seks a reversal of the conviction and 
dismissal of the case against him, or, in the alternative, 
to have the case remanded for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
\Vitnesses observed the appelant and another un-
identified individual both in the meat department of a 
grocery store at the same time. There was no further 
evidence connecting the two men. The other man was 
stopped in the parking lot with a box of nineteen unpur· 
chased hams in his possession. The appellant never left 
the store and was not stopped with any hams in his 
possession, but was detained as he was purchasing a 
package of potato chips and a six-pack of beer at the cash 
register. A second box of four hams was found in the 
rear of the store. The trial court instructed the jury as 
to the offenses of grand larceny, petty larceny, and at· 
tempted grand larceny, but failed to submit appellant's 
requested instruction and verdict of attempted pettv 
larceny. After the appellant's exception was not rem· 
edied, the appellant moved for a new trial because of the 
omitted instruction. The motion was not granted. 
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POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO IN-
STRUCT THE JURY REGARDING THE 
ELE1\1ENTS OF ATTEMPTED PETTY LAR-
CENY AND FAILING TO SUBMIT TO THE 
JURY A VERDICT INCLUDING THE OF-
FENSE OF ATTEMPTED PETTY LARCENY. 
The court in this case instructed the jury as to grand 
larceny, petty larceny, and attempted grand larceny, but 
declined to give the proposed instruction regarding at-
tempted petty larceny. Neither did the court submit to 
the jury the proffered verdict that included the offense 
of attempted petty larceny. Counsel for the appellant 
took proper exception to this omission ( T. 66) and later 
made a motion for a new trial on the grounds that the 
omission prejudiced the jury (R. 30). The lower court 
erred in failing to instruct and submit a verdict as to this 
lesser offense, and further erred by not granting appel-
lant's motion for a new trial. 
The most articulate expression of the Utah rule 
governing the question of when instructions on lesser 
offenses are necessary is found in the recent case of State 
v. Gillian, 23 Utah 2d 372, 463 P.2d 811 (1970). In 
Gillian, the trial court ref used to give the requested in-
structions on the lesser offenses of second degree mur-
der, voluntary and involuntary manslaughter in a homi-
cide prosecution. The Utah Supreme Court reversed 
the appellant's first degree murder conviction stating: 
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One of the foundational principles in regard to 
the ~ubmission of issues to juries is that where the 
parties so request they are entitled to have in. 
structions given upon their theory of the case· 
and this includes on lesser offenses if any reason: 
able view of the evidence would support such a 
verdict._ This is in accord with the authorities gen-
erally, [See State v. Castillo, 23 Utah 2d 70, 457 
P.2d 618 ( 1969) ; State v. Hyams, 64 Utah 285, 
230 Pac. 349 (1924); State v. Thompson, 110 
Utah 113, 170 P.2d 153 (1946); Stevenson v. 
Uni~ed States, 162 U.S. 313 (1896).] and with 
the adjudications of this court, as stated in a num-
ber of cases dealing with instructions on lesser 
offenses: In the case of State v. Johnson [112 
Utah 130, 185 P.2d 738 (1947)] it is said: 
That the defendant is entitled to have the jury 
instructed on his theory of the case if there is any 
substantial evidence to justify giving such an in-
struction. 
Of similar import is State v. Newton [105 Utah 
561, 144 P.2d 290 (1943)]: 
We have held that eaoh party is entitled to have 
his theory of the case which is supported by com· 
petent evidence submitted to the .fury by appro· 
priate instructions; and the failure to present for 
the jury's consideration a party's theory by ap· 
propriate instructions constitutes reversible error. 
[Cases cited.] 
The standards by which the court must determine if 
inshuctions on lesser offenses is necessary is very clearly 
expressed by the Gillian opinion. If any reasonable view 
of the evidence would support a verdict on the lesser of· 
fense, the court must instruct the jury on that offense. 
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The fact that his standard only requires "any reasonable 
yiew of the evidence" reflects the policy that judges 
should be very hesitant to refuse to instruct and submit 
verdicts as to lesser offenses. In State v. Hyams, 64 
Utah 285, 230 Pac. 349 ( 1924), the Utah Supreme 
Court, while reversing a conviction because instructions 
on a lesser offense were refused, declared: 
It is, however, always a delicate matter for a trial 
court to withhold from the jury the right to firn1 
the accused guilty of a lesser or included offense, 
and determine the question of the state of the evi-
dence as a matter of law. That, should be done 
only in very clear cases. 230 Pac. at 349. (Em-
phasis added. ) 
In light of the Gillian standard, such a clear case 
would only be present when no reasonable view of the 
evidence would support a lesser verdict. 
The reason the courts are so hesitant to uphold con-
victions achieved without instructions on lesser offenses 
is that decisions by a trial court to withhold from the jury 
the possibility of convicting for a lesser offense signifi-
cantly limits the jury's function, and, in effect, forces 
the defendant to prove his innocence. 
In Gillian, this court quoted with approval from 
Justice Straup's concurring opinion in State v. Fergu-
son, 74 Utah 263, 279 Pac. 55, 57 (1929). 
If in a case of different degrees of the offense 
there is sufficient evidence to submit the case to 
the jury of the charged greater offense, I do not 
see wherein it is the prerogative of the court to 
5 
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~irect the jury of wha~ degree only the jury may 
fmd the defendant gmlty, or to direct them that 
if they do not find him guilt~ o~ the chargetl 
greater offense they must acqmt him. To permit ' 
the court to do that. is to permit it to be the judqc 
of the facts. 463 P.2d at 813 (Emphasis added.) 
State v. Barkas, 91Utah574, 65 P.2d ll30 (1937), 
in reversing a conviction obtained without instructions 
on lesser offenses, considered this issue thoroughly. 
Should the trial court have instructed the jury as 
to lesser or included offenses? The appellant re· 
quested such instructions and after the court's 
charge was read to the jury, the district attornev 
called the attentions of the court to the fact th~t 
the court had not included in the charge any lesser 
or included offenses. The trial court replied that 
in its judgment there was no evidence to justify a 
verdict on a lesser offense and submitted the 
cause to the jury on only two possible verdicts, 
"guilty of assault with a deadly weapon with in· 
tent to do bodily harm,'' or "not guilty." ... This 
theory, however, clashes with two fundamental 
rules in trial of criminal cases: It has the effect o/ 
the court weighing the evidence and, in effect, 
limiting the ,jury to a consideration of only part 
of the evidence (the defendant's); and it, in ef-
fect, casts upon tJie defendant the burden of prov· 
ing his innocence or ,justification. 65 P .2d at 1132. 
(Emphasis added.) 
In our judicial system we presume a man innocent 
until proven guilty. By withholding the possibility of 
convictions for lesser offenses from the jury, a judge 
permits proof of guilt of a lesser offense to suffice for 
proof of the higher offense. Rather than putting the bur· 
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den on the state to prove the highest degree of offense 
that it can, this practice merely requires the state to 
establish evidence of some guilt in order to obtain a con-
riction for the greatest offense. If the jury is convinced 
that the defendant is guilty of something and the only 
choice presented to it is guilty or not guilty of a greater 
offense, only injustice can result. Either the jury is go-
ing to be repulsed by the implication of a penalty far 
greater than what it feels the defendant's action war-
rants, and therefore set a man free whom they feel is 
really guilty. Or the jurors are going to be repulsed by 
the latter idea of freeing a guilty man and convict for a 
crime beyond which they feel the evidence justifies. 
Of course, if no reasonable man could view the evi-
dence to permit a conviction for the lesser offense, the 
court is justified as a matter of law in refusing to submit 
to the jury instructions and a potential verdict for a 
lesser offense. It is therefore crucial in the instant case 
to apply the Gillian standard and determine "if any rea-
sonable view of the evidence" would support the lesser 
verdict of attempted petty larceny. 
The most significant single fact of this case is that 
the trial court found it proper to submit instructions and 
a verdict on the crimes of petty larceny and attempted 
grand larceny. The judge in this case felt the evidence 
could support either of these crimes. The fact that the 
offense of larceny perhaps was not complete and that the 
jury could find only an a tempt is not in dispute. Neither 
can it be disputed that the judge concluded the evidence 
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put the value of the goods at issue. By submitting and 
instructing on the crime of petty larceny the court dem-
onstrated that it felt the jury should determine if the 
state had proved the value of the hams was beyond fifty ' 
dollars ( R. 17). It is untenable to argue that evidence of 
the value of the goods in question would support a con-
viction for the crime of petty larceny, and not support a 
conviction for attempted petty larceny. The value of the 
goods does not change merely because an attempt to take 
them is not completed. 
The testimony in this case indicated that the gro-
cery store manager and one of his employees noticed 
two individuals in the meat department ( T. 6) . One of 
them, whom we only know as "the other individual," 
picked up a box of hams and walked out the front door 
of the store ( T. 8) . The manager testified that he 
stopped this man in the parking lot and that there were 
nineteen hams in the box in his possession ( T. 8-10) . The 
appellant never left the store but was seen heading in 
the opposite direction of the individual stopped in the 
parking lot after the two were observed together in the 
meat department (T. 8). About five minutes after the 
other man was apprehended, the appellant was detained 
as he went through the check-out counter. He had no 
hams in his possession and was at the time purchasing 
some potato chips and beer ( T. 12). A second box, con· 
taining four hams, was discovered a short time later in 
the back of the store (T. 10). 
The store butcher testified that he thought the value 
of the nineteen hams taken from "the other individual" 
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were valued at about eighty dollars ( T. 50). Of course, 
the value of ham is not that easy to determine and the 
jury should have the choice to accept or reject the 
butcher's opinion. In this case the judge allowed the 
jury to make this choice when they considered the offense 
of larceny, but determined the butcher's assessment of 
the value correct as a matter of law for the offense of at-
tempted larceny. Removing this element of the offense 
from the jury is not only improper, it is logically incon-
sistent. 
In addition, there was no direct evidence that the 
appellant and the individual apprehended with the nine-
teen hams were collaborators. The only evidence that 
connected them at all was that they were both seen in the 
meat department at the same time. Clearly, it is for the 
jury to determine if these two men acted together or 
separately. It is reasonable to conclude that the jury felt 
the evidence did not prove (beyond a reasonable doubt) 
that the appellant acted in concert with the other man, 
but that they were convinced (beyond a reasonable 
doubt) that the appellant had tried to take the four hams 
found in the back of the store. Indeed, given the lack of 
any evidence of a conspiracy, the fact that the four hams 
were found in the general area where the appellant was 
observed, and the rather suspicious actions of the ap-
pellant after he was apprehended, this is a very likely 
conclusion for the jury to reach. 
This theory only connects the appellant with four 
hams and would only support a conviction of attempted 
petty larceny. Yet, because of the failure to instruct as 
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to this offense any juror reaching this conclusion would 
be forced to either acquit or convict for the greater of. 
fense. 
In summary, the jury concluded in this instance that 
the offense of larceny had not been completed, and re· 
turned a verdict of attempt. The evidence clearly put 
the value of the goods at issue, and the trial court recog. 
nized this by instructing the jury on petty larceny. Since 
the jury found only an attempt, and the value of the 
goods was questionable, it is not only reasonable, it i~ 
likely that the evidence supported a verdict of attempted 
petty larceny. The court failed to instruct and submit as 
to this verdict and the only proper remedy in this situa· 
tion is to reverse and remand. State v. Gillian, 23 Utah 
2d 372, 463 P.2d 811 (1970); State v. Barkas, 91 Utah 
574, 65 P.2d 1130 (1937); State v. Hyams, 64 Utah 
285, 230 Pac. 349 ( 1924). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons it is respectfully con· 
tended that the conviction against appellant should be 
reversed, or, in the alternative, that the case should be 
remanded for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
410 Empire Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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